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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 970248-CA
Priority No. 2

BRANDON DAVID WRIGHT,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
THE STATE'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE STANDARD USED IN
DETERMINING A REDUCTION IN SENTENCING EMPLOYS AN INCORRECT
ANALYSIS AND MISCONSTRUES THE STATUTE AND PERSUASIVE CASE
LAW,
A. THE STATE HAS EMPLOYED AN INCORRECT ANALYSIS IN
ASSERTING THAT THE RIGID STANDARD USED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN
DETERMINING A DISCRETIONARY SENTENCING MATTER WAS
APPROPRIATE.
Defendant Brandon Wright ("Wright") has challenged the
manner in which the trial court applied Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402
(1995), in this case.

That Section provides the following:

(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was
found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the
conviction as being for that degree of offense established
by statute and to sentence the defendant to an alternative
normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose
sentence accordingly.
*

*

*

(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this
section unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing
or on the court record that the offense may be reduced two
degrees.
In no case may an offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
(Emphasis added).
In this matter, Wright pled guilty to aggravated robbery, a
1

first degree felony.

In connection with the plea, the state

twice stipulated on the record to a reduction in sentencing (R.
6 9 and 96) , so that the offense would be punished as a second
degree felony. The trial court refused to reduce the sentence on
the following basis:
I believe the standard
that I'm required
to consider
in
determining whether or not to sentence a person, who has
pled guilty to a first degree to a lesser sentence, that is
a second degree felony, is there is some basis
that
is
required
by the interest
of justice.
And I can't find any
in this case. The reasons that you suggest, Ms. KreeckMendez[, counsel for Wright], are rational reasons, but
that's not the basis in the statute so the motion [to reduce
the sentence] is denied.
(R. 96 (emphasis added).)

Wright maintains that the trial court

employed an incorrect standard in connection with ruling on the
matter.
1. The State Is Unclear with Regard to the Standard
Applicable to Trial Courts in Reducing Sentences.
In its brief, the state asserts that it is "impossible to
determine exactly what Judge Hanson meant by the [words
challenged on appeal] and what standard the trial court applied."
(State's Brief ("S.B.") at 8.)

Yet the trial judge's words are

set forth verbatim in the record and are undisputed with respect
to the standard the trial court applied in determining reduction
of Wright's sentence: "the standard
consider"

interest

is whether "there is

of justice. "

that

some basis

I'm
that

required
is

to

required

by

(R. 96.)

As set forth in Wright's opening brief, Utah case law has
given meaning to the standard articulated by the trial judge.
The standard that "requires" a trial judge to act in the
2

the

"interest of justice" is rigid providing the trial court with the
least amount of discretion. See State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,
125, 132 (Utah App. 1997) (trial court is required to engage in
specific analysis to determine whether the interests of justice
"will

best

be served"

in ruling on specific evidentiary matter);

State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1356 n. 3 (Utah 1986) (trial
court must

make in-depth evaluation of proposed evidence and

consider specific factors in determining whether interests of
justice will best be served); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah
1989) (legislative enactments will not be stricken "unless

interests

of justice

require

the

the same" under specific and limited

circumstances -- striking a legislative enactment is not
discretionary with the trial court); Anderson v. Public Service
Comm'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992) ("as a general
rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a government entity,"
except in "unusual circumstances 'where it is plain that the

interests

of justice

so require'");

State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d

1005 (Utah 1982) (court determined phrase "as
justice

requires"

the

interest

of

created a rare possibility; standard did not

provide trial court with broad discretion to act).
The state does not dispute that Utah appellate courts have
interpreted the standard identified by the trial court to be
rigid. (See S.B. in general.) Rather, the state suggests that the
trial court is not afforded wide discretion in determining
reduction of sentencing.
The state asserts that while language in State v. Lipskv.
3

608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980), recognizes that discretion is afforded
the trial court in exercising numerous alternatives available to
a defendant in sentencing, "Lipskv did not hold that the standard
to be followed by the trial court in determining whether or not
to reduce a sentence was a very wide discretion as claimed by the
defendant."

(S.B. at 9-10.)

The state's claim is perplexing.

The Utah Supreme Court's language in Lipskv is clear:
[The trial] court in fact has very wide discretion
in
sentencing. A court may sentence a defendant to a prison
term, impose a fine, enter iudcrment for a lower category
of
offense
pursuant
to § 76-3-402,
place him on probation,
disqualify him from public or private office pursuant to §
76-3-201, sentence the defendant to serve prison terms
concurrently or consecutively, order the defendant to pay
restitution, or suspend a prison sentence. As pointed out
in the dissent of Justice Wilkins in Reddish v. Smith,

supra, this wide variety
but absolutely
requires,

of alternatives
not only
permits,
the exercise of
discretion.

Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis added); see also State v.
Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 308 n.l. (Utah 1985); State v. Brooks, 631
P.2d 878, 879 (Utah 1981) (trial court may reduce sentence in
accordance with its "statutory prerogative"); State v. Harding,
576 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1978).
The state's assertions are in conflict with Utah law.

"Wide

discretion" is afforded the sentencing court in determining
reduction. Here, the trial court employed a rigid standard.
2. In Its Attempt to Define the Standard Available to the
Trial Courts in Sentencing Matters, the State Neglects
Mandatory Versus Permissive Indicators.
The state also claims that notwithstanding the limited
discretion afforded a court under the standard articulated by the

4

trial judge in this matter, and the wide latitude afforded a
trial court as identified in Lipsky in considering sentencing
matters, the trial court in this case applied the appropriate
standard in determining reduction of Wright's sentence.
To support that claim, the state focuses on the phrase
"interest of justice" as used by the trial court (R. 96), and
asserts that phrase is at the heart of Wright's challenge on
appeal. The state also seeks to define the phrase "unduly harsh"
as set forth in Section 76-3-402(1). The state misapprehends
Wright's challenge on appeal, and misconstrues the plain language
of Section 76-3-402(1).
With respect to the trial court's use of the phrase "in the
interest of justice," Wright has acknowledged in his opening
brief that such interests and the trial court's ability to
exercise wide discretion can co-exist.
In other matters, case law and statutory law allow the
courts to exercise "discretion" to further the "interests of
justice." See Utah R. Civ. P. 51 (1997) ("[T]he appellate
court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice may
review the giving of or failure to give an instruction");
Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 292 (Utah 1992) (trial court
in its discretion may allow pleading amendments in the
interests of justice under Utah R. Civ. P. 15); Crookston v.
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
(Brief of Appellant, dated June 11, 1997, at 7.)
The focus of Wright's challenge on appeal is not use of the
phrase "interest of justice."

Wright is challenging the court's

determination that it can only reduce the sentence if the
interests of justice so mandate.
Here, the trial court expressed that it was required to
5

exercise the most restrictive amount of discretion in determining
the matter. The trial court stated it could not act unless the
interests of justice "required"

the action.

is commanding, mandatory, demanding.

The term "required"

It is synonymous with

"must" and "shall," which are interpreted as "mandatory unless
some compelling reason indicating a contrary intent appears."
Glenn v. Ferrell, 304 P.2d 380, 382 (Utah 1956); see also Jones
by and through Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 559
(Utah App. 1992).
The statute on the other hand is drafted in terms of "permissive" conduct. The court "may . . . enter a judgment . . . for
the next lower degree of offense."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1).

"The use of the term 'may' gives the trial court discretion
. . . . According to its ordinary construction the term 'may'
means permissive . . . ."
820 (Utah App. 1992).

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818,

The statute empowers the trial court to

act under the more lenient standard by specifically providing
that the trial court "may" reduce the sentence.
76-3-402(1).

Utah Code Ann. §

Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, the

trial court has discretion in reducing sentences.
With regard to the state's discussion concerning the phrase
"unduly harsh," Section 76-3-402(1) simply provides that if the
court "regards" the factors set forth in the statute and
"concludes" the sentence as imposed is "unduly harsh," the trial
court "may"

reduce the sentence.

The unduly harsh language is

irrelevant with respect to determining the level of discretion
6

available to the trial court in deciding the reduction issue.
Stated another way, the statute permits the trial court to reduce
a sentence if it is unduly harsh. Likewise, after having
"regarded" the factors, the trial court may not
sentence.

reduce the

The plain language of the statute is permissive.

The crux of Wright's appeal is that the trial court did not
recognize that the plain language of the statute and the decision
in Lipsky provided the trial court with "wide discretion" in
determining reduction of Wright's sentence; the trial court
"believe[d]" the standard was rigid.

In describing its authority

to reduce a sentence, the trial court used language that
reflected it could only reduce the sentence if mandated

or

required by the interests of justice.
Since the state has failed to recognize the difference between the "mandatory" level of discretion and the "permissive"
level of discretion afforded to the trial court through the statutory language, its entire Point III is irrelevant.

Here, the

trial court imposed a mandatory level of discretion on itself,
while the statute provided the permissive level of discretion.
B. THE STATE IS INCORRECT IN ARGUING THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S
RULING ON WRIGHT'S MOTION DID NOT PRESERVE THE ISSUE ON
APPEAL, AND/OR WRIGHT SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE WHERE THE TRIAL
COURT EMPLOYED THE WRONG STANDARD IN REFUSING TO REDUCE HIS
SENTENCE.
The state asserts Wright's motion to the trial court to reduce his sentence was insufficient to preserve his argument arising from the court's ruling on that motion. That assertion is
incorrect. A motion is sufficient to preserve issues relating
7

thereto, particularly the ruling on the motion.
The state next relies on the Utah Supreme Court's decisions
in State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991), and State v. Bvwater,
748 P.2d 568 (Utah 1987), to assert this Court is precluded from
considering Wright's issue on appeal.

Those cases are not

persuasive on that point.
With regard to Elm, 808 P.2d at 1097, the defendant argued
on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in
connection with a sentencing matter.

Id. at 1098-99. While the

defendant failed to make a specific objection at the time of
sentencing concerning the issue, id. at 1100, the Utah Supreme
Court addressed the sentencing issue on the merits, taking into
consideration the statute at issue, case law interpreting the
statute, and the clear record concerning the trial court
proceedings. Id. at 1098-99.
Like the defendant in Elm, Wright has asked this Court to
consider the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-4 02 at
issue, case law identifying the court's discretion in considering
sentencing issues, and the clear statements of the trial court as
set forth in the record.

The record compels the determination

that the trial court exercised an inappropriate level of
discretion in considering the reduction issue.
Also, in Elm the defendant argued his due process rights
were violated during sentencing.

The defendant did not raise the

due process issue in the trial court.

Notwithstanding

"preservation" concerns, the Utah Supreme Court "examined the
8

records of the sentencing hearing and the arguments of both
parties" to determine the merits of the issue, and found no
obvious error.

Elm, 808 P.2d at 1100.

This Court is not presented with the same problems faced by
the Elm court in considering the due process issue.

Here, the

record is clear. "Because this case involves a sentencing error
rather than a trial error, the error is obvious on the face of
the record . . . ."

State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 941 (Utah

1996).
The state also relied on Bywater, 748 P.2d at 568. According
to the Utah Supreme Court in Labrum, Bywater is inapplicable when
the trial court is directed by statute

or judicial

decision

to

engage in the specific conduct at issue. Under the plain error
doctrine, if the statute directs the trial court to enter specific findings of fact in connection with enhancing a sentence,
Bywater is not controlling; Labrum is. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 940.
In Bywater, the defendant challenged the constitutionality
of the minimum-mandatory sentencing scheme of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-403.1 (which the court addressed on the merits), and he
asserted that the "trial court erred in failing to make specific
findings of fact and to articulate the standard of proof applied
in reaching the determination that the sentence of middle
severity should be imposed."

Bywater, 748 P.2d at 568.

"At the

time Bywater was decided, no statute or judicial decision
required an on-the-record recitation of facts supporting the

9

choice of the middle term of severity. . . Because the trial
court in Bywater apparently complied (although somewhat
cursorily) with [the statutory] requirement, failure to make
specific findings of fact could not have been plain error."
Labrum, 925 P.2d at 940.
Bywater is not applicable to this case.

The trial judge in

Wright's case applied the wrong standard as dictated
and judicial

decision.

by

statute

The trial court did not comply with plain

statutory language. Labrum governs here and supports that this
Court is not precluded from addressing the merits of Wright's
issue on appeal.

Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939-41.

Finally, the state claims that the plain error doctrine does
not apply in this case, since "a defendant must demonstrate three
points: first that an error exists, second, that the error should
have been obvious to the trial court, and third, that the error
was harmful."

(S.B. at 9 (citing State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d

1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1997)).)
According to the state, Wright cannot establish the first
and second points since Lipsky does not support providing the
trial court with "wide discretion" in determining reduction of
sentences pursuant to Section 76-3-402(1).

Also, the state

asserts that the trial court's imposition of a mandatory standard
is consistent with the permissive language of Section 76-3402(1).

The state is incorrect.

As set forth above, it has

disregarded compelling and binding language in Lipsky, see A.I.,
and misapprehends the difference between language that "requires"
10

action, and that which makes action permissive with use of the
term "may."

See A.2., supra.

With regard to the "third point," the state asserts that
assuming the trial court committed plain error by applying the
wrong standard, "defendant has failed to show that he has been
harmed by the alleged error."

(S.B. at 11.) In support of that

claim, the state relies on comments made by the trial judge in
rejecting a request for probation, and claims that such comments
"led the trial court to deny the motion to reduce the sentence."
(S.B. at 11.) The state is incorrect.
In considering the reduction in sentence, the trial judge
expressed that his hands were tied with respect to the issue
unless the interests of justice required the reduction. The court
then stated that Wright's counsel had presented "rational reasons" supporting the reduction. However, because the reasons did
not meet the rigid standard, he could not reduce the sentence.
(R. 96.)

The trial judge did not suggest that his bases for

rejecting probation were applicable in determining the reduction
in sentence. Indeed, the trial judge's statements concerning
probation were not made in connection with his ruling on the
request to reduce the sentence.

(See R. 96-97 (concerning

reduction in sentencing), and 98-99 (concerning probation).)
The state also asserts there is "no reasonable likelihood of
a different result" if the trial court had employed the correct
standard.

Yet, in this case the court had broader discretion to

determine the issue than it realized, and it expressed that
11

Wright presented rational reasons for reducing the sentence.

In

addition, the state stipulated twice to the reduction in
sentencing. Prejudice exists when it is unclear whether the trial
court would have reached the same result without the error.

The

trial court offered statements suggesting that it may have
ordered reduction of the sentence by one degree, but could not
because the stringent standard was not satisfied.

Based on the

record it is not clear how the trial court would have ruled in
this case if it had applied the more lenient, correct standard.
The error is prejudicial. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209
(Utah 1993) (in applying the prejudice prong in considering the
effects of an erroneous instruction, court determined error was
prejudicial simply because it could not be sure of the basis for
the jury's determination).
The issue on appeal in this case simply requires the Court
to consider the trial court's uncontroverted statement in the
transcript and apply the law.

Based on the trial court's

statements, it applied the wrong standard to determine whether
the sentence should be reduced.
CONCLUSION
Wright respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further
proceedings.
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